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Does answering "amen" add anything when one is already yotzei through shomeia k'oneh? The shiur examines the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s presentation in Hilchos Brachos perek 1, halachos 10-12, questioning why the Rambam states that one who answers amen is "k'mevorach" when earlier he ruled one is yotzei even without answering amen. The shiur explores whether amen provides an additional ma'alah beyond basic yotzei status and analyzes several seemingly contradictory Rambam passages.
This shiur presents an intensive analysis of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Brachos, perek 1, halachos 10-12, focusing on the relationship between shomeia k'oneh (fulfilling an obligation by hearing) and the obligation to answer amen. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Rambam's formulation that one who hears a bracha from beginning to end with intent to be yotzei is yotzei even without answering amen, but then adds that one who answers amen after the mevorach is "k'mevorach" - provided the mevorach was chayav in that bracha. The Kesav Mishna raises fundamental questions about this presentation. First, why does the Rambam need to introduce the second statement about answering amen at all? If one is already yotzei through shemiah alone, what is the purpose of discussing amen? The Kesav Mishna suggests that the Rambam is teaching that while one is technically yotzei without amen, answering amen provides an additional ma'alah - it makes one "k'mevorach," as if one had recited the bracha oneself. However, Rabbi Zweig finds this explanation deeply problematic.
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Hilchos Brachos 1:10-12
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