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How can a rebbe be obligated to treat his talmid as an equal while the talmid must treat the rebbe with morah Shamayim? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: in every relationship, person A's obligation to B is not B's entitlement—each must fulfill their own duty without demanding the reciprocal. This principle resolves apparent contradictions in Gemara (גמרא) and Rashi (רש"י) regarding rebbe-talmid seating arrangements and extends to all human relationships.
Rabbi Zweig addresses a fundamental question about seemingly contradictory halachos regarding the rebbe-talmid relationship. The Gemara (גמרא) in Megillah states explicitly that a rebbe should not sit on a bench while talmidim sit on the floor—they should be on equal footing. Yet Rashi (רש"י) in Pirkei Avos (hevei misaveid v'afar ragleihem) describes the custom where the rebbe sat on a bench and talmidim sat on the floor. Furthermore, Rashi in Parshas Beshalach says a rebbe should equate his talmid to himself (based on "bachar lonu anashim"), yet elsewhere we're taught morah rabba k'morah Shamayim—that fear of one's rebbe should be like fear of Heaven. The resolution lies in a fundamental yesod that governs all human relationships: In any relationship between person A and person B, A's obligation toward B is not the same as B's entitlement from A. Each person has their own set of obligations, but those obligations don't automatically create corresponding rights for the recipient. The rebbe must treat the talmid as an equal—that is the rebbe's din. The talmid must treat the rebbe with morah Shamayim—that is the talmid's din. But the talmid cannot demand to be treated as an equal (even though that's the rebbe's obligation), and the rebbe cannot demand morah Shamayim (even though that's the talmid's obligation).
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Parshas Beshalach - bachar lonu anashim; also Gemara Megillah, Pirkei Avos
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