Kamsa and Bar Kamsa: Two Approaches to Moral Responsibility

Full Summary

This shiur examines Gittin 55b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s introduction to the famous Kamsa Bar Kamsa story with the verse 'Ashrei Adam Hafach Etom' (Happy is the person who always fears). Rabbi Zweig presents two fundamental approaches to understanding the moral failures that led to Jerusalem's destruction. Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation centers on the concept of 'ro'eh shnolad' - seeing and taking responsibility for the consequences of one's actions. According to this view, even when doing something technically correct, one must consider and try to ameliorate negative consequences that may result. The problem wasn't necessarily that they acted wrongly, but that they failed to consider the ramifications of their behavior toward Bar Kamsa. Tosafos (תוספות) offers a dramatically different perspective, focusing on the danger of 'batu'ach arov tovosam' - being secure because of an abundance of good fortune. When people experience sustained success and prosperity, they mistakenly believe this validates their moral judgment and decision-making abilities. They assume that because God has blessed them materially, their instincts and choices must be correct. Rabbi Zweig develops this second approach extensively, explaining that most people operate under the false assumption that material success indicates divine approval of their behavior. This leads to dangerous moral overconfidence, particularly in interpersonal relationships (bein adam l'chavero). People become their own poskim in sensitive matters involving spouse, children, and neighbors, rarely seeking guidance because their prosperity seems to validate their judgment. The shiur explores the fundamental principle that God doesn't 'owe' us reward in a business sense. Rather, schar (reward) represents an exchange of feelings and affection, not a legal obligation. When people view their relationship with God as transactional - where good deeds create divine debt - they misunderstand the nature of divine providence. Success doesn't necessarily indicate righteousness; it may simply reflect that 'v'derech she'adam rotzeh leilech molichin oso' - a person gets what they desperately want, regardless of whether it's beneficial. The analysis extends to practical applications, noting how people readily consult rabbis about ritual matters (tefillin, kashrus) but almost never seek guidance about interpersonal issues like child-rearing, marital communication, or neighbor relations. Everyone considers themselves the 'gadol hador' in bein adam l'chavero, especially when experiencing material success. Rabbi Zweig concludes that both approaches address different aspects of moral responsibility: Rashi emphasizes accountability for consequences even when technically correct, while Tosafos warns against the moral complacency that accompanies prosperity. The Gemara's awkward formulation 'ahu gavra ba'ei d'ahu gavra' (this man is the enemy of that man) suggests the story involves broader communal conflict beyond personal animosity, possibly reflecting tensions between Kamsa and Bar Kamsa that divided the community into opposing camps.