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What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara (גמרא) debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 59a-b addressing the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" — the requirement that testimony be complete rather than partial. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where one set of witnesses testifies to a theft (geneivah) and another set testifies to the slaughter or sale (tvichah u'mechirah) of the stolen animal. The central question is whether this divided testimony violates the prohibition of "chatzi davar" (partial testimony). The Gemara initially suggests that the Mishna does not follow Rabbi Akiva's strict position on this matter. However, it then attempts to reconcile the Mishna with Rabbi Akiva by arguing that the testimony about theft stands independently without requiring the testimony about slaughter. The proof cited is from the case of kedushas bedek habayis (consecration for Temple maintenance), where even if the slaughter occurred before the consecration, there would still be liability for the consecration itself.
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Bava Kamma 59a-59b
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