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Why does the Torah (תורה) prohibit murder twice - once in Noach and again in the Ten Commandments? The dual punctuation of the Ten Commandments reveals two dimensions: murder as harming others (tam tachton) and murder as "playing God" by usurping divine authority over life and death (tam elyon). This explains why even justified executions involve an element of wrongdoing and why courts must approach life-and-death decisions with extreme gravity.
Rabbi Zweig begins by examining a puzzling Midrash that asks why we need the prohibition "lo tirtzach" (thou shalt not murder) when we already have the punishment for murder established in Parshas Noach. He introduces the concept of "tam elyon" and "tam tachton" - two different ways of punctuating and understanding the Ten Commandments. When read in the Sefer Torah (תורה) (tam tachton), the commandments are understood individually. When read in synagogue from the tablets (tam elyon), they can be read across both tablets, connecting "I am God who took you out of Egypt" with "thou shalt not murder," creating the meaning "do not play God." This reveals two dimensions of murder: First, under tam tachton, murder is forbidden because it harms another person - taking away their life unjustly. Courts executing criminals under this understanding are not committing murder because they are legally authorized to kill. Second, under tam elyon, murder is forbidden because it represents an act of "playing God" - usurping divine authority over life and death. Under this understanding, even courts are engaged in a form of "murder" because they are acting in God's place, which explains why the Mishna calls a court that executes even once in seventy years a "murderous tribunal" and why Rabbi Akiva said he would never serve on a capital court. Rabbi Zweig explains that the punishment of "shfichat damim" (spilling blood) specifically addresses this second dimension - the blood is spilled to demonstrate that the murderer's life is not sacred, countering his assumption that he could play God. He connects this to the requirement in Parshas Noach that murderers specifically have their blood spilled, rather than other forms of execution. The shiur explores how this dual understanding explains apparent contradictions in Chazal about whether killing can be positive (like Pinchas killing Zimri) or negative (courts being called murderous). When someone acts ministerially (like Pinchas following a clear divine command or an executioner carrying out a court's sentence), they are not "playing God" but fulfilling a predetermined obligation. However, when someone sits in judgment deciding life and death, they are necessarily taking on a God-like role. Rabbi Zweig connects murder and adultery as both involving displacement of God - murder by taking God's role in determining life and death, adultery by displacing God as the third partner in marriage. This explains why Yosef is praised for avoiding both sins and why they are grouped with idolatry as the three sins for which one must die rather than transgress. The analysis extends to modern medical and legal dilemmas, suggesting that decisions about euthanasia, abortion, and capital punishment all involve the problematic element of "playing God" - making determinations about the value and continuation of human life. The shiur concludes by emphasizing that while such decisions may sometimes be necessary and even obligatory, they must be approached with tremendous gravity and awareness of their God-like nature.
Parshas Noach, Parshas Yisro, Parshas Mishpatim
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