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Is shomea k'oneh fulfilled by hearing another's blessing, or by that person saying the blessing on your behalf? The Rambam (רמב"ם) and Tur present fundamentally opposite models: the Rambam holds you create a context for the listener's own amen-blessing, while the Tur holds the listener is fulfilled by hearing the speaker's blessing itself. This dispute reshapes the entire halacha (הלכה) of when amen is required and who must have intention.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of the principle of shomea k'oneh (hearing is like answering/responding) through a deep reading of the Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchos Brachos, contrasted with the positions of Tosafos (תוספות), the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch. The fundamental question is: when one person hears another recite a blessing, what is the mechanism by which the listener fulfills their obligation? Rabbi Zweig introduces the sugya by noting a series of apparent contradictions in the Rambam. The Rambam states that one who hears a blessing from beginning to end and intends to fulfill their obligation is yotzei even without answering amen. Yet the Rambam also says that answering amen is "harei ze k'mevorach" (this is like being the one who blessed). Furthermore, the Rambam rules that in certain cases—such as when people eat bread or wine together—one must answer amen, while in other cases amen is not required. The Kesef Mishneh struggles to reconcile these rulings, offering forced interpretations that Rabbi Zweig finds unsatisfactory.
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Hilchos Brachos (Rambam), Sukkah 38b
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