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Why does God 'hate gezel b'olah' when everything ultimately belongs to Him anyway? The shiur uses the Gemara (גמרא)'s parable of a king paying taxes at his own tollbooth to show that when God established property rights, He chose to honor them absolutely - even binding Himself to respect human ownership rather than benefit from stolen korbanos.
This shiur examines a complex passage in Masechta Sukkah dealing with the concept of mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah b'aveirah (a mitzvah performed through sin), specifically regarding stolen objects used for korbanos. The Gemara (גמרא) states that a stolen animal may never be used for a korban, even after the original owner has given up hope (ye'ush) and the thief has technically acquired it. The Rav begins by questioning Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that using a stolen korban constitutes an "issur" (prohibition) rather than simply invalidating the mitzvah. The central focus is on understanding the biblical verse "I hate gezel b'olah" (I hate theft in burnt offerings) through a parable about a king who pays taxes at his own tollbooth. Initially, this parable seems disconnected from the halachic discussion, as the king loses nothing by paying himself. The Rav resolves this by explaining that the tollkeeper receives a percentage of collections, so when the king pays, he demonstrates respect for the rights he granted to his appointee.
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Sukkah (discussing mitzvah haba'ah b'aveirah and stolen korban)
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