An analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Sanhedrin where Gavi ben Pesisa defends the Jewish people against Egyptian claims by establishing that Jews were subjects, not slaves, in Egypt and therefore entitled to wages.
This shiur analyzes the famous Gemara (גמרא) in Sanhedrin 91a about Gavi ben Pesisa's brilliant legal defense before Alexander the Great when the Egyptians sued the Jewish people for the gold and silver taken during the Exodus. The Egyptians claimed the Jews had borrowed their valuables and demanded their return. Gavi ben Pesisa's defense was that the Jews were entitled to wages for 430 years of labor in Egypt, which far exceeded the value of what was taken. Rabbi Zweig addresses a fundamental question: how could slaves be entitled to wages? Halachically, a slave has no right to demand payment for his work. The answer lies in understanding Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation of the pasuk "Anochi Hashem (ה׳) Elokeicha asher hotzeiticha me'eretz Mitzrayim mibeis avadim." According to Rashi, "mibeis avadim" doesn't mean "from the house of slaves" but rather "from Pharaoh's house where you were subjects (avadim)." This distinction is crucial - the Jews were Pharaoh's subjects, not his slaves. The difference between subjects and slaves has major halachic implications. A king has the right to draft his subjects for work, confiscate property, and impose taxes, but he must provide adequate compensation. According to the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s laws of kings, a monarch cannot take labor from his subjects without payment. Slaves, however, have no such rights. Since the Jews were subjects who were drafted for labor but never paid, they had a legitimate claim for wages. This interpretation completely transforms our understanding of the mitzvah (מצוה) of "Anochi Hashem Elokeicha." Rather than establishing God as our master (adon) who owns us as slaves, it establishes Him as our King (melech) to whom we are subjects. This answers the Kuzri's question of why the Torah (תורה) doesn't say "Anochi Hashem Elokeicha asher barati shamayim v'aretz" (who created heaven and earth). The relationship God wants with us is that of King and subjects, not master and slaves, even though He certainly has the right of creation over us. This distinction affects our entire understanding of Torah and mitzvos. If we are God's subjects rather than slaves, then our service (avodah) comes with the expectation of reward (sechar). God obligates Himself to compensate us for our service, which is reflected in the concept of reward for mitzvos. The Aseres HaDibros represent not commandments from a master to slaves, but laws from a King to His subjects, establishing a covenant relationship rather than mere ownership.
Rabbi Zweig explores how Israel becomes God's 'mother' through accepting divine kingship, analyzing the deeper meaning of 'crowned by his mother' in Shir HaShirim and its connection to the grammatical ambiguity in 'Bereishis bara Elokim.'
Rabbi Zweig explores Eichah Rabba's interpretation of 'Bas Galim' (daughter of waves), revealing two distinct types of teshuvah: decisional repentance based on personal choice, and instinctive repentance rooted in learned behaviors from our forefathers.
Sanhedrin 91a
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