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How can the Torah (תורה) command the complete eradication of Amalek when the entire world recognizes genocide as a crime against humanity? The shiur develops a powerful yesod: Amalek forfeited membership in the brotherhood of nations by becoming a self-destructive force—willing to die not to defeat Israel, but merely to cool off the world's fear of the Jews. When a nation cannot be deterred or controlled because it lacks all self-preservation, eradicating it becomes morally justified.
Rabbi Zweig opens with a penetrating question that goes to the heart of Torah (תורה) morality. After World War II, the Nuremberg Trials established that genocide is a crime against humanity—a crime so fundamental to human conscience that it requires no legislation, and citizens are obligated to disobey governmental orders to commit it. The Allies ruled that the Nazi defense of "following orders" was invalid because genocide is ultra vires—beyond any government's legitimate authority. Yet the Torah explicitly commands the complete destruction of Amalek (Devarim 25:17-19). If human reason universally recognizes genocide as immoral, how can the Torah—the ultimate source of morality—command it? The question becomes even sharper in light of Rashi (רש"י)'s principle (Bereishis 1:1) that the Torah includes Sefer Bereishis specifically to answer the accusation that Jews are thieves of Eretz Yisrael. Rashi's answer—that Hashem (ה׳) created and owns the land—implies that "Hashem commanded it" is insufficient justification for an apparently immoral act. The Torah must make sense on moral terms; Hashem does not tell us to be thieves or murderers simply because we are His chosen people. Rabbi Zweig acknowledges that according to the Rambam (רמב"ם) (Hilchos Melachim), the question may not arise, since the Rambam holds that even obligatory wars (milchemes mitzvah (מצוה)) require first offering peace terms and acceptance of the Seven Noahide Laws. If the enemy accepts, there is no obligation to destroy them—this applies even to Amalek. The Raavad disagrees regarding Amalek, leaving Ashkenazim without this answer. But Rabbi Zweig is not satisfied with a purely technical resolution; the Torah must be teaching us the underlying moral principle.
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Why does the Midrash connect Pharaoh's expulsion of the Jews to the mitzvah of shiluach hakan? The shiur develops a chiddush that Pharaoh's sin wasn't only drowning the children, but the insensitivity of expelling the parents afterward. The deeper analysis reveals that Pharaoh may have valued the Jews greatly and wanted to control them—making his expulsion an act of tremendous cruelty, not liberation.
Why does Moshe respond to the splitting of the sea with shirah rather than praise or thanksgiving? Rashi's use of "al libo" reveals that shirah is an emotional expression—a response of love to love. When Hashem shows personal care, the only adequate response is "I love You too," not mere gratitude or praise, and this principle applies to all relationships.
Devarim 25:17-19
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