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What justified Moshe's killing of the Egyptian who beat a Hebrew slave? The Mizrachi holds that prophecy merely permitted Moshe to kill, so he needed confirmation that no righteous descendants would emerge. The Maharal argues that prophetic knowledge of the Egyptian's capital sin created an actual obligation to execute him unless specifically told otherwise.
This shiur examines a fundamental disagreement between the Mizrachi and Maharal regarding Moshe Rabbeinu's killing of the Egyptian who was beating a Hebrew. The discussion centers on the phrase 'vayar ki ein ish' - that Moshe saw through prophecy that no righteous converts or descendants would come from this Egyptian. The Mizrachi argues that when Moshe received a prophetic vision that the Egyptian committed adultery with a married woman (for which a Ben Noach is liable to death), this prophecy did not create an actual death sentence but merely informed Moshe that the Egyptian deserved to die. Since there was no formal obligation to kill him, Moshe would have been forbidden to do so if there was any possibility of righteous descendants emerging from him. Therefore, Moshe needed a specific prophetic confirmation that no good would come from this person before he could permissibly kill him. The Maharal, while claiming to build on the Mizrachi's approach, presents what appears to be a fundamentally different position. According to the Maharal, the initial prophecy that the Egyptian was guilty of a capital offense created an actual obligation for Moshe to execute him. This prophetic knowledge established a genuine chayav misah (death sentence), and Moshe would have been required to carry it out unless he received a counter-prophecy specifically instructing him not to kill due to future righteous descendants. The key difference lies in their understanding of prophetic knowledge versus formal testimony. The Mizrachi maintains that prophecy, unlike the testimony of witnesses, creates permission but not obligation. Therefore, other considerations - like potential descendants - can override the permission to kill. The Maharal views prophetic knowledge as equivalent to formal legal testimony, creating an actual death sentence that requires execution unless specifically countermanded by divine instruction. This leads to opposite practical conclusions: according to Mizrachi, uncertainty about descendants prevents killing; according to Maharal, only certain knowledge of future righteous descendants prevents the required execution. Rabbi Green notes his bewilderment at how the Maharal claims to be merely explaining the Mizrachi's position when they appear to be making fundamentally different arguments about the nature of prophetic knowledge and its legal implications.
Parshas Shemos 2:12
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