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How could Bathsheba marry Dovid after their affair without violating the prohibition of eishes ish? The Gemara (גמרא) explains she received a conditional get before Uriah went to war, but Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot offer competing interpretations of these military divorce documents. Their machloket centers on whether the condition was 'if I die' (solving yibum issues) or 'if I don't return' (covering broader scenarios).
This shiur examines Masechta Kesubos 9b, which discusses the famous story of King Dovid and Bathsheba through a halachic lens. The Gemara (גמרא) presents two approaches to explain why Bathsheba didn't become forbidden (asur) to Dovid after their encounter. The first approach suggests it was considered coerced (ones), while the second explains that she was actually divorced (gerusha) because her husband Uriah, like all soldiers in Dovid's army, had written a conditional get before going to war. The shiur delves deeply into the machloket between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot regarding these conditional divorce documents. Rashi explains that soldiers wrote conditional gittin stating 'if I die in war, this should be a get from the day it was written (mehayom).' This was primarily to solve the problem of yibum (levirate marriage) - if the soldier died, his wife would immediately become divorced rather than widowed, thus avoiding potential complications with chalitzah. Tosafot challenges Rashi's interpretation on multiple grounds. First, Tosafot questions why the condition would be limited to death, when this would only help in cases involving yibum, which wouldn't apply to most soldiers. Second, Tosafot has difficulty with Rashi's use of 'mehayom' (from today), arguing that this language doesn't align with conditional divorce formulations found elsewhere in the Gemara. Tosafot offers an alternative reading: the soldiers wrote 'if I don't return from war' rather than specifically 'if I die.' This broader condition would cover various scenarios including capture or extended military service. According to this interpretation, 'mehayom' would mean the divorce takes effect from the day the condition is met, not retroactively from the day of writing. The shiur also addresses why the Gemara refers to Bathsheba as a 'safek eishes ish' (doubtfully married woman). According to Rashi, this reflects the genuine uncertainty created by the conditional get - she might or might not be married depending on whether the condition was fulfilled. Tosafot explains that she was actually definitely divorced, but it was done secretly to prevent social pressure and unwanted marriage proposals, so people were uncertain about her status. The discussion raises profound questions about the nature of conditional divorce, the relationship between different prohibitions in adultery cases, and how halachic technicalities interact with moral considerations. The Acharonim debate whether the prohibition against the wife returning to her husband and the prohibition against her marrying her paramour are two separate laws or interconnected aspects of one prohibition. This analysis demonstrates the Talmud (תלמוד)'s sophisticated approach to understanding biblical narratives through the lens of Jewish law, showing how even the most sensitive historical accounts are subjected to rigorous halachic analysis while maintaining respect for the biblical figures involved.
Kesubos 9b
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