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Why can you sell a Beis HaKnesses to buy a tevah but not a heichal according to the Rambam (רמב"ם), while the Shulchan Aruch equates them? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: the Beis HaKnesses is structured as a precise replica of the Beis Hamikdash, with the heichal representing the place of avodah and the tevah (on the bimah) representing the azarah—the place of both avodah and Malchus Yisrael. The tevah's dual kedusha makes it kadosh me'od.
This shiur presents a revolutionary understanding of the structure and function of a Beis HaKnesses according to the Rambam (רמב"ם), demonstrating that it is not merely a place of prayer but a precise replication of the Beis Hamikdash with distinct areas corresponding to different levels of kedusha. The shiur begins with a fundamental question from Mishna Megillah: the Mishna states that when one sells a Beis HaKnesses, one can use the proceeds to buy a tevah. The Shulchan Aruch explains that tevah has two possible meanings—either the heichal (what we call the aron kodesh built into the wall) or a tevah in the middle of the shul on the bimah where the Sefer Torah (תורה) was kept during leining. The Mechaber rules that you can sell a Beis HaKnesses to buy either one. However, the Rambam in Hilchos Tefillah (11:14) rules that you can only buy a tevah—specifically the one in the middle—but not a heichal. This creates an extraordinary difficulty: how can the smaller tevah holding one Sefer Torah have greater kedusha than the magnificent heichal built into the wall that might hold twenty-five sifrei Torah?
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Megillah 26a
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