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Can a man marry half a woman? The Raavad and Gemara (גמרא) reveal that kiddushin has two dimensions: kinyan (ownership) and ishus (relationship). The woman becomes fully meyuchad to her husband, but he remains only an owner—explaining why "chatzi ish" (half a man) poses no problem, while "chatzi isha" (half a woman) invalidates the marriage unless she's not yet a person, like an unborn child.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 7a regarding the concept of "chatzi isha" (half a woman) in the context of kiddushin. The central question revolves around the Raavad's position that if someone says explicitly "chatzi isha mekudeshes li" (half of you is betrothed to me), the kiddushin is valid, which seems to contradict the Gemara (גמרא)'s implication that such explicit language would invalidate the kiddushin. The Rashba asks a fundamental question on the Raavad: if there's a principle of "ish v'lo chatzi ish" (a man but not half a man) that excludes a half-slave, half-free man from certain laws, why shouldn't the same principle of "isha v'lo chatzi isha" (a woman but not half a woman) exclude a half-slave, half-free woman from kiddushin? The shiur also addresses R' Shlomo Eiger's question: the Rambam (רמב"ם) rules that one cannot acquire only the fetus of a pregnant maidservant (because it's like acquiring "chatzi eved"), yet the same Rambam permits betrothing an unborn fetus—why isn't that considered "chatzi isha"?
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Kiddushin 7a
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