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May a Jew ask a non-Jew to perform a melacha d'oraisa on Shabbos (שבת) for the sake of milah? The shiur analyzes the Bahag's position that amirah l'akum is permitted for milah, Tosafos (תוספות)'s challenge from the Gemara (גמרא) in Chulin regarding marbeh b'shiur, and the Maharsha's reading that Tosafos answers by distinguishing tzorech mitzvah (מצוה) (milah, Yom Tov) from ordinary cases.
This shiur is a deep analysis of a difficult Tosafos (תוספות) on Gittin 8b dealing with the permissibility of amirah l'akum—asking a non-Jew to perform labor—on Shabbos (שבת) for the sake of milah (circumcision). The discussion centers on competing opinions and the internal logic of Tosafos's argument. The shiur opens by laying out Tosafos's position: amirah l'akum is permitted for yishuv Yisrael (settling the Land of Israel) even when the non-Jew would be performing a biblical prohibition. By milah, however, amirah l'akum to do a biblical prohibition is not permitted, but shevus d'shevus (a rabbinic prohibition on top of a rabbinic prohibition) is permitted. For other mitzvos, even shevus d'shevus is forbidden. Tosafos also permits marbeh b'shiur (adding to the amount being prepared) in certain contexts.
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Gittin 8b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
