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May a Jew ask a non-Jew to perform a melacha d'oraisa on Shabbos (שבת) for the sake of milah? The shiur analyzes the Bahag's position that amirah l'akum is permitted for milah, Tosafos (תוספות)'s challenge from the Gemara (גמרא) in Chulin regarding marbeh b'shiur, and the Maharsha's reading that Tosafos answers by distinguishing tzorech mitzvah (מצוה) (milah, Yom Tov) from ordinary cases.
This shiur is a deep analysis of a difficult Tosafos (תוספות) on Gittin 8b dealing with the permissibility of amirah l'akum—asking a non-Jew to perform labor—on Shabbos (שבת) for the sake of milah (circumcision). The discussion centers on competing opinions and the internal logic of Tosafos's argument. The shiur opens by laying out Tosafos's position: amirah l'akum is permitted for yishuv Yisrael (settling the Land of Israel) even when the non-Jew would be performing a biblical prohibition. By milah, however, amirah l'akum to do a biblical prohibition is not permitted, but shevus d'shevus (a rabbinic prohibition on top of a rabbinic prohibition) is permitted. For other mitzvos, even shevus d'shevus is forbidden. Tosafos also permits marbeh b'shiur (adding to the amount being prepared) in certain contexts.
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Gittin 8b
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