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Why does a stolen lulav disqualify one on both Yom Tov Rishon and Sheini? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י) and Rabbeinu Chananel on Sukkah 30a, developing the yesod that mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah b'aveirah only applies when the aveirah provides an element required by the mitzvah itself—on Yom Tov Rishon the "lachem" (ownership) requirement, and on Yom Tov Sheini the right to use (z'chus hashtamshus).
This shiur examines the Gemara (גמרא) in Sukkah 30a concerning the disqualification of a stolen lulav through the principle of mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah b'aveirah. The core question addressed is why a stolen lulav is considered "pasul" (disqualified) rather than simply lacking the requirement of "lachem" (belonging to you), and how this principle operates differently on Yom Tov Rishon versus Yom Tov Sheini. Rabbi Zweig begins by analyzing Rabbeinu Chananel's position, which appears problematic because it suggests that on Yom Tov Sheini before ye'ush (despair of the original owner), the lulav is invalid because it's not yours—seemingly not requiring mitzvah haba'ah b'aveirah at all. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that if this were true, the Gemara's entire discussion of mitzvah haba'ah b'aveirah would be superfluous. Additionally, Rabbeinu Chananel states that according to Shmuel, one is only yotzei with a stolen lulav after ye'ush, implying there is a disqualification before ye'ush even on Yom Tov Sheini according to Shmuel.
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Sukkah 30a
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