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Why is one witness believed to permit a woman to remarry (eid echad ne'eman b'issurim) when testimony about her husband's death normally requires two witnesses? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: does eid echad in issurim establish facts like testimony in monetary cases, or does it merely create likelihood sufficient to permit? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position emerges that issurim require no judicial fact-finding—only reliable evidence—while the Rabanan instituted a formal din for pragmatic reasons (mishum agunah).
This shiur explores a fundamental question in the laws of testimony: why does the Torah (תורה) accept a single witness (eid echad) to permit a woman to remarry when her husband has died, while normally establishing facts requires two witnesses? The Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin discusses this question in the context of a woman's status as a chazaka of issur—she is presumptively forbidden to remarry until we know her husband has died. Tosafot addresses the contradiction: how can we rely on one witness when the woman has a chazaka status of being forbidden? The Marshas explains that Tosafot holds there is no reason to assume she is still seeing dam (blood), so her testimony doesn't contradict any established facts. The Ramban (רמב"ן) offers two answers: first, since the Torah believes her regarding herself (for bedikahs and mikvah), she is therefore believed regarding her husband. Second, it is simply impossible (efshar) for the system to work otherwise—no one can check all her bedikos, and people need to be able to live with their wives and fulfill peru urvu.
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Gittin 2b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
