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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) rule that kiddushin with "shnei chatzayich b'pruta" (half and half with a pruta) is no good? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: when one says "half and half" he wants two kinyanim (ownership rights) rather than a complete marital relationship, unlike "mona b'holech" where the halves progress to a whole. This explains the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling and reconciles apparent contradictions in Tosafot.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 7b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of kiddushin with divided intentions—specifically the case of "shnei chatzayich b'pruta" (half of you with this half-pruta, half of you with that half-pruta). The fundamental question is why this case should be invalid when it appears to be better than other cases that are valid. The Gemara presents several scenarios: (1) chatzi b'chatsi pruta v'chatzi b'chatsi pruta (half with half-pruta, repeated); (2) chatzi b'pruta v'chatzi b'pruta; (3) chatzi hayom v'chatzi machar (half today, half tomorrow); and (4) shnei chatzayich b'pruta. The Rambam (רמב"ם) rules that the first two cases are vadai kiddushin (certain betrothal), while the last case is only safek kiddushin (doubtful). This ruling raises serious difficulties: if saying the kiddushin should happen in two halves at different times can work (through the principle of "mona b'holech"—counting progressively), why should saying both halves together with one pruta be worse?
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Kiddushin 7b
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