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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) sometimes use "chayav" for a minor's obligations and sometimes only "mitzvah (מצוה)"? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: "chayav" means the child himself has a real obligation (e.g., sukkah, lulav), while "mitzvah" means only the parent's training duty exists. This yields major nafka minas—including why a mother must facilitate her child's rabbinic obligations even though she has no formal chinuch duty, and why Beis Din intervenes only when the father causes the child to violate Shabbos (שבת) (lo sa'asuru kol melacha), not when chinuch alone is at stake.
Rabbi Zweig delivers an in-depth analysis of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation of the mitzvah (מצוה) of chinuch (educating minors in mitzvos), focusing on a fundamental chakira that runs through fifteen different places in the Rambam's writings. The shiur opens by noting that in some contexts, the Rambam uses the language "chayav" (obligated) when describing a minor's relationship to mitzvos, while in other places he uses only "mitzvah al ha'av" (a commandment upon the father) or simply discusses training without the term "chayav." The core thesis is that there are two entirely different halachic structures at work. Where the Rambam says a minor is "chayav," he means the child himself has a real, albeit rabbinic, obligation to perform the mitzvah—the only difference between him and an adult is his age. Examples include sitting in a sukkah, taking a lulav, and wearing tzitzis. In these cases, the child's chiyuv is real and operative. In contrast, where the Rambam uses "mitzvah al ha'av l'chancho" without the term "chayav," the obligation rests solely on the parent to train the child; the child himself has no independent duty.
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Yoma 82a
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