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Why can't kiddushin spread from half to the whole woman when kodesh spreads from part to whole in a korban? The shiur analyzes three approaches to das acheres ma'akiv: Tosafos (תוספות) (she doesn't want), Rashba (she participates in creating the hispashtus), and Rambam (רמב"ם) (passive acceptance differs from active action). Each mehalech fundamentally redefines the mechanics of kiddushin and hispashtus.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Kiddushin 7a-b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s question of why kiddushin does not spread through hispashtus (expansion) when a man attempts to marry only half a woman (chatzi isha). The fundamental question is: if kedusha spreads from a partial designation to the whole animal in hilchos korbanos (when one designates a foot as an olah, the entire animal becomes kodesh), why doesn't the same principle apply to kiddushin? The shiur begins by establishing two foundational approaches to understanding chatzi isha from the Rivash and Rambam (רמב"ם). According to the Rivash's approach, chatzi isha means the man wants hilchos kinyanim without the full chalos of ishus—he wants to acquire her as property without complete marital status. By the man it's only kinyanim, so chatzi works; by the woman it involves both kinyanim and ishus, creating a problem. The Gemara's challenge is: let the kedusha spread to complete kiddushin through hispashtus.
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Kiddushin 7a-b
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