A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) distinguish between foods "not fit for eating" (einan ra'uyin le'achilah) and foods "not fit for human consumption" (einan ra'uyin le'achilas adam)? The shiur develops a fundamental chiluk: by eating, only things with some pleasure warrant makas mardus, but by drinking, anything that relieves dehydration triggers the issur, even if not fit for human consumption. This explains three categories for eating versus two for drinking.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental question in the laws of Yom Kippur regarding foods and liquids that are not fit for consumption. The starting point is a difficulty in the Tur (Yoreh Deah 12) and Beis Yosef's attempt to resolve it. The core issue is why the Rambam (רמב"ם) appears to distinguish between different categories of non-kosher foods when discussing liability on Yom Kippur. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that the Rambam in Hilchos Shevitat Asor (Perek 2, Halachos 5-7) actually establishes three distinct categories for eating but only two for drinking. For eating: (1) foods fit for human consumption (ochlin hara'uyin le'adam) carry kareis liability; (2) foods fit for eating but not for human consumption (ochlin she'einan ra'uyin le'adam) are exempt from kareis but carry makas mardus; (3) things not fit for eating at all (einan ra'uyin le'achilah) are completely exempt with no makas mardus. The Rambam signals this structure by using different terminology—calling the third category "kos" rather than "achilah."
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Yoma 81b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
