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Why would a pit shallow enough not to kill (bor tes) still obligate for injury, while a deep pit (bor yud) obligates for death? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s two approaches: one views bor tes as *actually causing* death but exempt because it's not darko lehamas, making it a separate toldah; the other sees all boros as a single av—you're liable for whatever damage the bor actually causes.
This shiur offers a detailed analysis of the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of bor (pit) liability on Bava Kamma 3a, focusing on the distinction between bor yud (a pit ten tefachim deep, capable of killing) and bor tes (a pit nine tefachim deep, incapable of killing but capable of causing injury—nezikin). The Gemara begins with the question of whether bor for misah (death) and bor for nezikin (injury) are both written explicitly in the Torah (תורה), or whether one is an av (primary category) and the other a toldah (derivative). The Gemara initially states that neither misah nor nezikin are explicitly written. It then brings a pasuk—"hameisi elo"—that seems to indicate misah is written. Finally, the Gemara concludes, "If so, both are written" (ze'av lamisa, ze'av lanezikin). Rabbi Zweig highlights the difficulty: how does the Gemara move from "neither written" to "one written" to "both written"? What changed?
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Bava Kamma 3a
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