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When can silence constitute acceptance of kiddushin? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether a woman who remains silent when receiving kiddushin is mekudeshes, distinguishing between cases involving shadchanus (prior agreement to marry), stolen property returned as kiddushin, and when silence indicates consent versus fear of financial liability.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of a complex sugya on Kiddushin 13a dealing with whether a woman's silence (shtika) constitutes acceptance of kiddushin. The central question is whether kiddushin requires affirmative consent or whether passivity suffices. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses multiple scenarios. First, a case of a woman selling bundles of silk (varshki) where a man takes one and asks "Will you be married to me?" She takes it and remains silent. Rav Nachman rules she can say "ein shakli v'dede shakli" - "I only took it to take back what is mine" - meaning her silence does not constitute acceptance since she has an independent reason to take the item (reclaiming her property).
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Kiddushin 13a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
