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When can silence constitute acceptance of kiddushin? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether a woman who remains silent when receiving kiddushin is mekudeshes, distinguishing between cases involving shadchanus (prior agreement to marry), stolen property returned as kiddushin, and when silence indicates consent versus fear of financial liability.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of a complex sugya on Kiddushin 13a dealing with whether a woman's silence (shtika) constitutes acceptance of kiddushin. The central question is whether kiddushin requires affirmative consent or whether passivity suffices. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses multiple scenarios. First, a case of a woman selling bundles of silk (varshki) where a man takes one and asks "Will you be married to me?" She takes it and remains silent. Rav Nachman rules she can say "ein shakli v'dede shakli" - "I only took it to take back what is mine" - meaning her silence does not constitute acceptance since she has an independent reason to take the item (reclaiming her property).
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Kiddushin 13a
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