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When does the principle of kam lei b'deraba minei apply when fire damages property and kills a person simultaneously? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between Rebbe Akiva (who holds eish is chitzah) and Reish Lakish (who holds eish is mamona). The shiur explores whether the rodef principle or the chiyuv misa principle patur the mazik from paying for property damage, developing a fundamental chakira in the din of rodef.
The shiur analyzes Bava Kama 22b, which discusses the application of kam lei b'deraba minei when a person's fire kills an eved (slave) and burns a g'di (kid goat) simultaneously. According to the Mishna, if someone holds eish mishum chitza (fire is like an arrow), they are liable for the property damage; but if they hold eish mishum mamona (fire is property damage), they are exempt. The Gemara (גמרא) asks: If someone holds eish mishum mamona, why should they be exempt for the g'di? The gemara suggests it's because of kam lei b'deraba minei—since the person is chayav misa for killing the eved, this exempts them from monetary liability. But the Gemara objects: according to Reish Lakish who holds eish mishum mamona, there shouldn't be a chiyuv misa for killing the eved through fire, because it wasn't done directly (b'gufo).
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Bava Kama 22b
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