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What distinguishes a father's obligation to teach his son Torah (תורה) from the general mitzvah (מצוה) to teach all students? The shiur develops the Kesef Mishneh's approach that these are fundamentally different duties—one is training the child to function as a Jew (limited to Mikra), the other is fulfilling one's own mitzvah of teaching Torah (encompassing all of Torah). The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation, however, suggests a unified obligation: filling voids of Torah in the world, with priority given to voids one has created.
The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 29b derives the father's obligation to teach his son Torah (תורה) from the pasuk "v'limadtem osam es b'neichem." A fundamental question emerges: why does the Gemara use this pasuk rather than "v'shinantam l'vanecha"? The Pnei Yehoshua explains that v'shinantam applies to teaching talmidim (all of Torah), while v'limadtem applies specifically to one's son (limited to Mikra). But where does the Gemara derive this limitation to Mikra? A second difficulty arises when the Gemara states that if the father failed to teach him, the son must teach himself, citing "u'limadtem osam ushmartem la'asos." Why is this pasuk necessary when we already have v'shinantam l'vanecha establishing everyone's general obligation to learn Torah? If everyone is already obligated to learn, why need a special obligation when the father was derelict?
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Kiddushin 29b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
