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What distinguishes a father's obligation to teach his son Torah (תורה) from the general mitzvah (מצוה) to teach all students? The shiur develops the Kesef Mishneh's approach that these are fundamentally different duties—one is training the child to function as a Jew (limited to Mikra), the other is fulfilling one's own mitzvah of teaching Torah (encompassing all of Torah). The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation, however, suggests a unified obligation: filling voids of Torah in the world, with priority given to voids one has created.
The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 29b derives the father's obligation to teach his son Torah (תורה) from the pasuk "v'limadtem osam es b'neichem." A fundamental question emerges: why does the Gemara use this pasuk rather than "v'shinantam l'vanecha"? The Pnei Yehoshua explains that v'shinantam applies to teaching talmidim (all of Torah), while v'limadtem applies specifically to one's son (limited to Mikra). But where does the Gemara derive this limitation to Mikra? A second difficulty arises when the Gemara states that if the father failed to teach him, the son must teach himself, citing "u'limadtem osam ushmartem la'asos." Why is this pasuk necessary when we already have v'shinantam l'vanecha establishing everyone's general obligation to learn Torah? If everyone is already obligated to learn, why need a special obligation when the father was derelict?
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Kiddushin 29b
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