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When does a listener need to answer "amen" after a bracha to be yotzei? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds that when the mevarech makes the bracha for himself, the listener must answer amen to create his own bracha. But when the mevarech acts purely as a shaliach—making the bracha solely for the listener—shomea k'oneh applies and no amen is required. This directly contradicts the Tur's approach.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s view on shomea k'oneh (hearing is like responding) in Hilchos Brachos, revealing a fundamental disagreement with the approach of the Tur and Beis Yosef. The central question is: When must a listener answer "amen" after hearing a bracha in order to be yotzei his obligation? The shiur identifies two fundamentally different approaches. The Tur, citing the Rosh, holds that when the mevarech is mechuyav in the bracha himself (e.g., making kiddush for himself while also being motzi others), the listener does NOT need to answer amen—shomea k'oneh suffices. But when the mevarech is not mechuyav (e.g., already fulfilled the mitzvah (מצוה) and is only making the bracha for others), the listener MUST answer amen. According to this view, shomea k'oneh works through arvus—the mevarech creates words that the listener can convert into a bracha by answering amen.
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Sukkah 38a, Rambam Hilchos Brachos 1:10-12
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