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Can a yevama who is pregnant receive chalitza, or must we wait until she gives birth? The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish over whether we retroactively apply knowledge (iglo milson mafreya) when the child is later miscarried. The shiur analyzes multiple approaches in Tosafos (תוספות) and Nemuke Yosef regarding what determines the validity of chalitza—the embryo's current state or its ultimate fate.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of Yevamos 35b, focusing on the fundamental machlokes between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding chalitza muberes (chalitza performed on a pregnant woman who is a yevama). The central question is whether chalitza can be validly performed before the outcome of the pregnancy is known, and whether we apply the principle of iglo milson mafreya (retroactive clarification) when the child is later miscarried. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a case where a yevama who is pregnant receives chalitza, and then later miscarries. The question arises: was the chalitza valid? If we say iglo milson mafreya—that the later miscarriage retroactively reveals that there was no viable child at the time of the chalitza—then the chalitza should be valid. However, Reish Lakish maintains that we do not say iglo milson mafreya in this case, while Rabbi Yochanan disagrees, stating "im yavo Eliyahu"—if Eliyahu the prophet would come and tell us the child's status, we could rely on that knowledge.
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Yevamos 35b
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