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Why can't we learn from a ma'atzad (multiple sources) that an aseh overrides a lo sa'aseh accompanied by another aseh? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s approach: ein aseh docheh lo sa'aseh v'aseh is not about competing mitzvos but about whether the aseh and lo sa'aseh combine into a single strengthened prohibition. This yesod explains why Tosafos rejects the ma'atzad from nazir, kohen, and milah.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Maseches Yevamos (daf 5a) dealing with the principle of ein aseh docheh lo sa'aseh v'aseh—an aseh (positive commandment) does not override a lo sa'aseh (negative commandment) when that lo sa'aseh is accompanied by another aseh. The Gemara (גמרא) attempts to derive this principle from a ma'atzad (common denominator) of multiple sources but encounters difficulties with each proposed source. The shiur opens by examining Tosafos (תוספות)'s central question: why can't we learn this principle from a ma'atzad involving nazir, metzora, and kohen? In each case, there is an issur gilui'ach (prohibition of shaving) alongside a mitzvas aseh, and another aseh (milah or tumah) does not override them. Tosafos raises several difficulties: First, there is a tzad hashava (common element) in all three—the issur of gilui'ach. Second, when examining milah specifically, the Gemara could have responded with "gadol hashalom" (the principle that brit milah has special status), which would have been a sufficient answer, so why didn't Tosafos suggest this?
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Yevamos 5a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
