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Why can't we learn from a ma'atzad (multiple sources) that an aseh overrides a lo sa'aseh accompanied by another aseh? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s approach: ein aseh docheh lo sa'aseh v'aseh is not about competing mitzvos but about whether the aseh and lo sa'aseh combine into a single strengthened prohibition. This yesod explains why Tosafos rejects the ma'atzad from nazir, kohen, and milah.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Maseches Yevamos (daf 5a) dealing with the principle of ein aseh docheh lo sa'aseh v'aseh—an aseh (positive commandment) does not override a lo sa'aseh (negative commandment) when that lo sa'aseh is accompanied by another aseh. The Gemara (גמרא) attempts to derive this principle from a ma'atzad (common denominator) of multiple sources but encounters difficulties with each proposed source. The shiur opens by examining Tosafos (תוספות)'s central question: why can't we learn this principle from a ma'atzad involving nazir, metzora, and kohen? In each case, there is an issur gilui'ach (prohibition of shaving) alongside a mitzvas aseh, and another aseh (milah or tumah) does not override them. Tosafos raises several difficulties: First, there is a tzad hashava (common element) in all three—the issur of gilui'ach. Second, when examining milah specifically, the Gemara could have responded with "gadol hashalom" (the principle that brit milah has special status), which would have been a sufficient answer, so why didn't Tosafos suggest this?
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Yevamos 5a
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