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When does a shtar require edei mesira (witnesses to delivery) to effect kinyan? Tosafos (תוספות) on Gittin 4a suggests that edei mesira karsei means witnesses must always be present at delivery, even for ordinary shtaros—yet proposes hoda'ah as ba'al din might substitute for witnesses. The shiur wrestles with how admission by a litigant could create a maaseh kinyan when the delivery itself is what makes the shtar effective.
This shiur examines a difficult Tosafos (תוספות) on Gittin 4a that explores the requirement of edei mesira (witnesses to the delivery) in the context of various types of legal documents. The fundamental question is whether a shtar (document) can effect a kinyan (legal acquisition) based solely on edei chasima (witnesses who signed the document), or whether it always requires edei mesira—witnesses who were present when the shtar was delivered. Tosafos begins by establishing that according to Rav Meir, a get requires edei mesira, and if there are no witnesses to the delivery, the get is invalid. The rationale is ein davar sheb'ervah b'paches miShnayim—matters of forbidden relationships (ervah) cannot be established with fewer than two witnesses. Tosafos extends this principle to other documents: shtar matana (gift deed), shtar mechir (bill of sale), and documents effecting kinyan karka (acquisition of land). According to Rav Elazar, whose opinion we follow in these matters, if we know there were no witnesses present at the delivery (yodua shelo nosnan lifnei edim), the document is invalid.
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Gittin 4a
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