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Can pidyon haben be fulfilled with an object worth less than five selaim if someone values it higher? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between something objectively worth five versus something a gavra rabba would actually spend five for. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling—that an item not worth five in the market can work if the kohen accepts it—raises questions about kohen hamasa b'veis hagranos and the nature of ledidi chazi.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 8a, focusing on the sugya of pidyon haben and the concept of ledidi chazi (subjective valuation). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether an eved Ivri can be acquired through chalipin and distinguishes between how the master acquires him versus how the eved redeems himself. The Mishneh LaMelech clarifies that the miyut of "bekesef mignasa" applies only to how a non-Jew purchases an eved Ivri, not to how the eved redeems himself—there's no contradiction between the limitation on money acquisition and the permissibility of self-redemption with kesef. The main focus is on the case where someone gives an object to a kohen for pidyon haben saying "ledidi chazi chamesh selaim" (to me it's worth five selaim), even though it's objectively worth less. The Gemara brings Rav Kahana, described as a gavra rabba (important person), who accepted a sudra (scarf) for pidyon haben because he needed it for covering his head. The key question: does ledidi chazi mean merely that I receive five selaim worth of benefit, or that I would actually spend five selaim to acquire it?
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Kiddushin 8a
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