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Can a woman's silence after receiving kiddushin money constitute acceptance? The shiur analyzes Kiddushin 12b-13a's debate: does silence mean she accepts (because she didn't throw it away), or does she need affirmative agreement? The Gemara (גמרא)'s logic that "she should have thrown it away" challenges fundamental assumptions about what kiddushin requires.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 12b-13a dealing with the fundamental question of shtika l'achar matan maos—whether a woman's silence after receiving kiddushin money constitutes valid kiddushin. The discussion revolves around a seeming contradiction in the Gemara's reasoning and what it reveals about the nature of kiddushin itself. Rabbi Zweig begins by framing two opposing approaches to understanding shtika (silence). One view (represented by "Avi" in the discussion) holds that kiddushin requires affirmative acceptance from the woman; therefore, neutral silence without agreement is insufficient, and shtika l'achar matan maos is not valid kiddushin. The alternative view (represented by "Eli" and "Yonatan") argues that silence after receiving kiddushin money is actually like rejection—since the original giving was not l'shem kedusha (for the sake of marriage), the continued holding without explicit acceptance shows she doesn't want it.
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Kiddushin 12b-13a
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