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What is the essence of eid zomim? The shiur contrasts two approaches: the Rambam (רמב"ם) holds the chiddush is that we "place" the witnesses elsewhere (making their testimony impossible), not that we testify they lied; Rashi (רש"י) and the Ritzgayus hold we directly believe they lied. The nafka mina governs psul ha'eidus shelo befanav and whether one of three witnesses is killed.
The shiur examines Bava Kamma 62b and the fundamental nature of the halachos of eid zomim (conspiring witnesses). The opening discussion presents Rashi (רש"י)'s position on a Mishna case where one of two witnesses is proven to be a zomeim: Rashi explains that the second witness is exempt because "ein eidim meshulmin mamon ad shehazim shenayhem"—witnesses don't pay unless both are proven to be zomim. Rabbi Zweig asks: one witness is clearly a liar (placed elsewhere), the other told the truth—why does Rashi invoke the rule of "ad shehazim shenayhem" rather than simply saying the truthful witness is exempt because he told the truth? The Gemara (גמרא)'s dispute between Abaya and Rav is then explored. Abaya says eid zomim are pasul "lemafre'a" (retroactively from when they testified), citing "al toshes rosh eid." Rav says they are pasul only "mikan ul'haba" (from now on), because eid zomim is a chiddush and we don't apply it retroactively. Rabbi Zweig asks: Why does Abaya need to cite a pasuk at all? The question is *when* they are pasul, not *why*. And why does the Gemara say that according to Rav, even though it's a chiddush, they are still pasul going forward—once we believe the second pair, don't we definitively know the first pair lied when they testified?
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Bava Kamma 62b
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