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How close must a woman stand to her chatzer for her get to be acquired there? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rav Ashi and Ula regarding proximity (besoch vs. betzad), and develops the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י)/Tosfos and the Rambam (רמב"ם) over whether this is a din in kinyan chatzer or a din in yad—with major nafka minos regarding lavud, partial ownership, and whether the husband must be mashil the entire chatzer or just the makom where the get lands.
This shiur analyzes Gemara (גמרא) Gittin 77b, focusing on the laws governing when a woman can acquire her get (bill of divorce) through her chatzer (courtyard). The central question is whether the woman must physically stand within (besoch) her chatzer or merely adjacent to (betzad) it. The Gemara presents a dispute between Rav Ashi, who requires that she be "besoch beisah"—within her property—and Ula, who holds that being "betzad beis" or "betzad chatzer"—alongside her property—is sufficient. Rabbi Zweig examines the textual difficulty: the Mishna uses the language "besoch beiso," which seems to support Rav Ashi's position, yet Ula appears to contradict this. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between two rationales for the requirement. According to one approach, the chatzer works through the principle of "yad" (her hand), requiring proximity (samuch). According to the other approach, chatzer functions through "shlichus" (agency), where even distance (mishtameres) suffices as long as she is watching over it.
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Gittin 77b
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