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Why does the Rashba rule that one who lights a fire that will kill someone is patur from damages even after the victim dies? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira between Rabi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding rodef: whether killing the rodef is an onesh (punishment) that exempts through kam lei b'derabbah minei, or merely hatzalah (rescue) that doesn't create such an exemption. According to Rabi Yochanan (esh mishum chitzo), the rodef status creates a chiyuv misah that exempts from all damages; according to Reish Lakish (esh mishum mamono), it's only hatzalah and doesn't exempt after death.
This shiur provides an intricate analysis of Bava Kamma 22b, focusing on the Rashba's treatment of the machlokes between Rabi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding liability for damages caused by fire when one person lights another on fire. The fundamental question is why someone who is a rodef (pursuer intending to kill) would be exempt from payment for damages that occur after the victim dies. The shiur begins by establishing that there's no such thing as a "long ma'aseh retzicha" (extended act of murder). Unlike by Shabbos (שבת), where there's a melacha with a beginning (akirah) and end (hanachah), making it one continuous act, by retzicha the issur is not the action but the result—the death itself. When someone shoots an arrow or administers poison, if another person kills the victim before the poison takes effect, the first person is not guilty of retzicha. This fundamental distinction shapes the entire discussion.
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Bava Kamma 22b
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