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What makes a get a valid shtar—the witnesses who sign it or those present at its delivery? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira between Rav Meir and Rabbi Eliezer: both agree a get must function as a shtar kinyan, but disagree on which witnesses create that shtar status. This resolves Rav Kibeger's question about eidus shebatla and explains why lishmo applies differently to writing versus signing.
This shiur on Gittin 3b analyzes the fundamental machlokes between Rav Meir and Rabbi Eliezer regarding which witnesses are essential (karsei) for a get: eidei chasimah (witnesses who sign) or eidei mesirah (witnesses who see the delivery). The Gemara (גמרא) asks: who holds you need both ksiva lishmo and chasimah lishmo? It cannot be Rav Meir, because according to him you need chasimah lishmo but not ksiva lishmo. Rabbi Zweig presents Rav Kibeger's fundamental question: According to those who hold ksav sofer v'eid echad (the scribe's handwriting plus one witness) is kosher, the sofer himself functions as an eid echad. His handwriting is his "signature." Therefore, you should need ksiva lishmo for the sofer, just as you need chasimah lishmo for witnesses—because his writing IS his chasimah. Furthermore, if two witnesses sign lishmo but the sofer wrote shelo lishmo, this should create eidus shebatla u'mektzasa batla kula (partial disqualification invalidates the whole testimony). Rav Kibeger concludes there is no din of eidus shebatla here, which requires explanation.
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Gittin 3b
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