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How does the principle of kam lei bideraba minei apply when someone lights a fire that kills a slave and burns property? The Rashba introduces a complex analysis involving rodef status: the chiuv misah is at the moment of lighting (not when the slave dies), creating a framework where the chiuv misah and the maisa mechayev mamon occur simultaneously. This resolves why there's no liability for property damage.
This advanced shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 22b, focusing on a complex sugya involving kam lei bideraba minei in the case of one who lights a fire (hadlakas eish) that both kills a slave and burns property. The core question is how the principle that a capital liability exempts from monetary liability applies when these two chiyuvim occur at different times. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where someone lights a fire that burns property and kills a slave. According to the principle of kam lei bideraba minei, when someone is liable for capital punishment, he is exempt from monetary liability. The Rashba raises a fundamental difficulty: the chiuv mamon (liability for the burned property) seems to come either before or after the chiuv misah (capital liability for killing the slave), not simultaneously. If the property burns first, how can the later chiuv misah exempt it? If the slave dies first and then property burns, the chiuv misah has already occurred—how can it exempt subsequent monetary liability?
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Bava Kamma 22b
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