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Can rabbinic authorities annul a Torah (תורה)-level marriage retroactively? The Gemara (גמרא)'s statement "kol mekadesh adaata derabanan mekadesh" raises the question of whether annulment works retroactively or prospectively. Rabbi Zweig analyzes the dispute between geonim and Rashi (רש"י) regarding divrei sofer, the nature of kedushin kesef versus shtar, and the limits of rabbinic power over Torah law.
This shiur addresses Gittin 33a and examines fundamental questions about rabbinic authority to annul marriages and the mechanisms by which kedushin takes effect. The primary focus is the principle of "afkinhu rabbanan lekiddushin minei" (the Sages annulled the marriage) and the related concept of "kol mekadesh adaata derabanan mekadesh" (anyone who betroths does so according to rabbinic stipulation). Rabbi Zweig presents a dispute between the geonim and Rashi (רש"י) regarding the concept of divrei sofer. According to the geonim, when kedushin kesef is called "divrei sofer," this means it is only rabbinic in nature, not Torah (תורה) law. Rashi strongly objects to this interpretation, arguing that one cannot kill a na'arah me'orasah (betrothed maiden) based on kedushin that is merely rabbinic. The shiur explores Rashi's fundamental objection: how can something that appears explicitly in the Torah's written text be classified as merely rabbinic?
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Gittin 33a
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