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Why can't a gazlan's machshava determine tumah status unless there's yiush kinyan? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between two kinds of halachos: mishkav lo hagozel depends on ownership (where kinyan gezela suffices even without full yiush), while machshava mitamesan depends on who the ultimate consumer will be. The din of avdan proves that even full ownership doesn't create tumah if the object is omed limocher—so too, a gazlan cannot be kovea shem even when yiush removes the nigzal's ownership, because the halacha (הלכה) requires him to return it.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 56b, focusing on a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) about when a gazlan (thief) can be metamei an object through his machshava (intention). The Gemara presents a series of cases: by an avdan (craftsman who owns the object), machshava is mitamesan (effective); by a seller, machshava is not mitamesan because it's omed limocher (designated for sale); by a ganav, machshava is mitamesan only if there's yiush kinyan; by a gazlan, machshava is not mitamesan unless yiush kinyan exists. The core difficulty arises from Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation that yiush means the object no longer belongs to the nigzal (victim). If so, why does the Gemara require yiush kinyan for the gazlan to be able to determine the object's status? Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that this appears to contradict yesterday's Gemara about mishkav lo hagozel, where Rashi explained that even if yiush is not koneh (doesn't effect acquisition), the object is still mekabel tumah because it no longer belongs to the nigzal. Why shouldn't the same logic apply here?
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Bava Kamma 56b
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