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What transforms a woman into an "isha" — a wife — according to the Torah (תורה)? The shiur demonstrates that kiddushin is not itself the mitzvah (מצוה) but the necessary context for nisuin. Drawing on Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Ishus, the shiur distinguishes between pilegesh (relationship without responsibility), kedeisha (promiscuity), and true marriage, showing that kiddushin creates the framework within which living together becomes halakhically sanctified nisuin.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of the opening of Masechta Kiddushin 2a alongside the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Ishus chapters 8-9, offering a fundamental re-reading of what kiddushin accomplishes and what constitutes marriage in Jewish law. The shiur begins by examining the Rambam's historical introduction to hilchos ishus, where the Rambam describes that before the Torah (תורה) was given, a man would bring a woman into his house (machnisah lebeiso), live with her, and she would become his wife. Rabbi Zweig asks: what is the significance of this "bringing into the house"? Why does the Rambam emphasize this particular detail? Furthermore, the Rambam rules in Hilchos Melachim that either party in a non-Jewish marriage can terminate the relationship by leaving — yet how can someone who is "property" terminate ownership? This apparent contradiction frames the entire discussion.
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Kiddushin 2a; Rambam Hilchos Ishus 8-9
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