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Does a woman need to own her get, or does it merely need to be placed in her hand? The shiur develops three major shitos: Rashi (רש"י) holds chatzer works al ko'ach kinyan (even balkoach she acquires the get); the Tur/Mordechai hold chatzer is an extended hand requiring only nesinah without kinyan; and the Rambam (רמב"ם) appears to follow the second approach, transforming the get achmei agav karka question.
This shiur presents a fundamental machloket in the nature of divorce law, centering on Gittin 77a and the principle of chatzer ki'yadah. The core question is whether a woman must actually own (be koneh) the get for the divorce to take effect, or whether it is sufficient for the get to be placed in her domain (nesinah) without formal acquisition. Rabbi Zweig begins by analyzing Rashi (רש"י)'s position, both in Gittin and in Bava Metzia 11b. Rashi states in Bava Metzia that "yada kanya ma'agav get al kochach" - the hand acquires the get even against her will. This indicates that according to Rashi, receiving a get in one's hand is fundamentally an act of kinyan (acquisition). Therefore, when the Gemara (גמרא) says chatzer works like yad, it means chatzer also creates a kinyan in the get. Even balkoach (against her will), she becomes the owner of the get through chatzer, just as she becomes owner through her physical hand. This answers the question about issur hana'ah (an item forbidden in benefit): the Torah (תורה) made the get transferable balkoach as a special mechanism of kinyan, not because kinyan is unnecessary. Both yad and chatzer require kinyan according to Rashi.
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Gittin 77a
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