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Does the Torah (תורה)'s requirement of "v'kasav" (he shall write) apply to the writing of the get, the signatures of the witnesses, or both? The shiur analyzes the fundamental dispute between Rav Meir (who holds chasimas eidim karti) and Rav Elazar (who holds af eidei mesirah karsi) regarding which elements of a get must be written lishmah, exploring the implications of kasav she'mechubar and kasav tolash.
This shiur delves into a complex sugya on Gittin 3b concerning the requirement of lishmah (proper intent) in writing a get (bill of divorce). The fundamental question is how to understand the Torah (תורה)'s directive "v'kasav v'nasan lah" — what exactly must be written lishmah? Rabbi Zweig opens with a fundamental challenge to the Gemara (גמרא)'s assumption. The Gemara assumes that according to Rav Meir, who holds "chasimas eidim karti" (the essence of the get is the witnesses' signatures), only the chasimah (signing) needs to be lishmah, not the ksiva (writing). But this is perplexing: if v'kasav means you need a proper get, and a proper get according to Rav Meir requires chasimas eidim, why wouldn't the entire process — both the writing of the text and the signing — need to be lishmah? How does the Gemara know that Rav Meir doesn't require ksiva lishmah?
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Gittin 3b
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