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What is the nature of the kal vachomer proving shtar works for kiddushin, and what kind of shtar is the Gemara (גמרא) discussing? The shiur analyzes the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rashbam (Rivdaz) over whether kiddushin functions as hilchos kinyanim (property acquisition law) or as a religious ceremony (maaseh pidyon/issur-heter). The discussion clarifies Rashi's position on shtar adme'i and explores the principle of ein kategan na'aseh saneigor.
The shiur opens with a detailed analysis of the sugya in Kiddushin 5a regarding whether shtar works for kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) brings a kal vachomer: since shtar is motzi (works for divorce) while kesef is not, and kesef is machnis (works for kiddushin), surely shtar should also be machnis. The first fundamental question is: what is the logic of this kal vachomer? Is it comparing shtar to kesef (shtar is superior to kesef), or is it comparing motzi to machnis (being motzi is harder than being machnis)? The Rivdaz (Rashbam) argues that the kal vachomer is based on the principle that being motzi (releasing from issur) is more difficult than being machnis (creating issur), since motzi involves matir issur (permitting the forbidden) while machnis only involves assur mutar (forbidding the permitted). Therefore, if shtar can accomplish the harder task (motzi), it should certainly accomplish the easier one (machnis). However, Rabbi Zweig challenges this reading as unprecedented—kal vachomer arguments do not typically require detailed reasoning of this sort; they rely on demonstrated facts, not philosophical principles about the relative difficulty of halachic acts.
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Kiddushin 5a
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