A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why is someone who steals and slaughters on Yom Kippur liable but on Shabbos (שבת) exempt? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s approach that ma'asei Shabbos is prohibited only for eating, explores the Gemara (גמרא)'s terutz of tove'ach al yedei acher (agency), and works through the Maharsha's fundamental question: if the Mishna refers to agency on Yom Kippur, why wouldn't Shabbos also be through agency and thus liable?
This shiur presents an intensive analysis of Bava Kamma 61a, focusing on the fundamental question of why someone who steals and slaughters an animal on Yom Kippur is liable to pay while someone who does the same on Shabbos (שבת) is exempt. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion revolves around Rabbi Meir's position on ma'asei meshalam (whether forbidden labor exempts from payment) and how to reconcile seemingly contradictory Mishnayos. Rabbi Zweig begins by exploring Tosafos (תוספות)'s approach to ma'asei Shabbos, explaining why food cooked on Shabbos is prohibited only for eating but not for other uses according to one view. The shiur develops the principle that issur achila has a unique stringency because the forbidden substance becomes part of one's being—it's like poison in your system that remains even after teshuvah. This differs from other Shabbos violations where the act is external and doesn't become internalized in the same way.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Bava Kamma 61a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
