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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) permit amir le-akum to write a shtar on Shabbos (שבת) for acquiring land in Eretz Yisrael? The shiur analyzes whether the heter applies to shtar kinyan or shtar rayah, whether kinyan itself is permitted on Shabbos, and explores Rashi (רש"י)'s understanding that yishuv Eretz Yisrael means displacing goyim—raising questions about the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s omission of yishuv Eretz Yisrael from the 613 mitzvos.
This shiur examines Gittin 8b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s ruling that one may instruct a non-Jew to write a shtar on Shabbos (שבת) for the purpose of yishuv Eretz Yisrael (settling the Land of Israel). Rabbi Zweig opens by analyzing Rashi (רש"י)'s two seemingly contradictory explanations: the first Rashi suggests the shtar is a shtar kinyan (a document that effects acquisition), while the second Rashi describes it as a shtar rayah (a document serving as proof of an already-completed purchase). The shiur explores the fundamental difference between these two types of documents and their halachic implications. A central question emerges: if the shtar is a shtar kinyan, then the heter would permit making a kinyan (acquisition) on Shabbos itself, which is normally prohibited as a rabbinic decree. If it is a shtar rayah, the seller has already received payment and wants to leave town, and the buyer simply wants written proof to prevent future disputes—in this case, the heter would apply to protecting one's property rights, extending the concept of yishuv Eretz Yisrael beyond the act of acquisition to the protection of Jewish ownership.
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Gittin 8b
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