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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) permit amir le-akum to write a shtar on Shabbos (שבת) for acquiring land in Eretz Yisrael? The shiur analyzes whether the heter applies to shtar kinyan or shtar rayah, whether kinyan itself is permitted on Shabbos, and explores Rashi (רש"י)'s understanding that yishuv Eretz Yisrael means displacing goyim—raising questions about the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s omission of yishuv Eretz Yisrael from the 613 mitzvos.
This shiur examines Gittin 8b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s ruling that one may instruct a non-Jew to write a shtar on Shabbos (שבת) for the purpose of yishuv Eretz Yisrael (settling the Land of Israel). Rabbi Zweig opens by analyzing Rashi (רש"י)'s two seemingly contradictory explanations: the first Rashi suggests the shtar is a shtar kinyan (a document that effects acquisition), while the second Rashi describes it as a shtar rayah (a document serving as proof of an already-completed purchase). The shiur explores the fundamental difference between these two types of documents and their halachic implications. A central question emerges: if the shtar is a shtar kinyan, then the heter would permit making a kinyan (acquisition) on Shabbos itself, which is normally prohibited as a rabbinic decree. If it is a shtar rayah, the seller has already received payment and wants to leave town, and the buyer simply wants written proof to prevent future disputes—in this case, the heter would apply to protecting one's property rights, extending the concept of yishuv Eretz Yisrael beyond the act of acquisition to the protection of Jewish ownership.
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Gittin 8b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
