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Why would signing a get "she'lo lishma" be considered mezuyaf mitocho (forged within) if there's no requirement for chasima lishma? The shiur examines Gittin 3b-4a, analyzing the machlokes between Rav Meir and Rav Elazar and proposing that according to Rav Elazar, eidei chasima must testify that the sofer wrote the get lishma—not merely that they themselves signed lishma.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental difficulty in Gittin 3b-4a regarding the requirement of chasima lishma (witnesses signing a get for the specific purpose of this divorce). The Gemara (גמרא) presents a dispute between Rav Meir and Rav Elazar: according to Rav Meir, only kesiva lishma (writing the get for this specific woman) is required from the Torah (תורה), while according to Rav Elazar, both kesiva lishma and chasima lishma are required mid'Oraysa. The central difficulty Rabbi Zweig addresses is the Gemara's statement that according to Rav Elazar, a get with mezuyaf mitocho (internal forgery) would be invalid. Rashi (רש"י) explains mezuyaf mitocho as referring to witnesses who signed she'lo lishma (not for this specific divorce). But this creates a fundamental question: if according to Rav Elazar there is no requirement for chasima lishma, what is inherently wrong with witnesses signing she'lo lishma? Why should it be considered mezuyaf mitocho at all? Mezuyaf mitocho typically refers to something improper within the document—like related witnesses who are invalid. But if there's no requirement for lishma in the chasima, what exactly is improper about she'lo lishma?
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Gittin 3b-4a
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