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Why would signing a get "she'lo lishma" be considered mezuyaf mitocho (forged within) if there's no requirement for chasima lishma? The shiur examines Gittin 3b-4a, analyzing the machlokes between Rav Meir and Rav Elazar and proposing that according to Rav Elazar, eidei chasima must testify that the sofer wrote the get lishma—not merely that they themselves signed lishma.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental difficulty in Gittin 3b-4a regarding the requirement of chasima lishma (witnesses signing a get for the specific purpose of this divorce). The Gemara (גמרא) presents a dispute between Rav Meir and Rav Elazar: according to Rav Meir, only kesiva lishma (writing the get for this specific woman) is required from the Torah (תורה), while according to Rav Elazar, both kesiva lishma and chasima lishma are required mid'Oraysa. The central difficulty Rabbi Zweig addresses is the Gemara's statement that according to Rav Elazar, a get with mezuyaf mitocho (internal forgery) would be invalid. Rashi (רש"י) explains mezuyaf mitocho as referring to witnesses who signed she'lo lishma (not for this specific divorce). But this creates a fundamental question: if according to Rav Elazar there is no requirement for chasima lishma, what is inherently wrong with witnesses signing she'lo lishma? Why should it be considered mezuyaf mitocho at all? Mezuyaf mitocho typically refers to something improper within the document—like related witnesses who are invalid. But if there's no requirement for lishma in the chasima, what exactly is improper about she'lo lishma?
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Gittin 3b-4a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
