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What makes matana al menas lehachzir invalid for kiddushin and pidyon haben but valid for terumah? The shiur argues that the problem is not lack of value but lack of true nesina—when something must be returned, the recipient is merely "holding" rather than receiving. By terumah, where only nesina is required (not transfer of value), matana al menas lehachzir works.
The shiur opens with the Gemara (גמרא)'s presentation of matana al menas lehachzir (a gift given on condition that it be returned). Rava states that such a gift is invalid for mechira (sale), kiddushin, and pidyon haben, yet valid for terumah. The Gemara initially thought this indicates that matana al menas lehachzir is considered "lo shemo matana" (not a proper gift), but then asks: if so, why should it work for terumah? The Gemara concludes that it is actually "shemo matana" and works for all cases except where there's a separate issue like the prohibition of kohen mesayei'a bei sagronos (a kohen working in the granary to obtain terumah). Rabbi Zweig raises the Kesef Mishneh's question: the Rambam (רמב"ם) rules (Hilchos Bikkurim 11:8) that pidyon haben with matana al menas lehachzir is invalid, yet omits the Gemara's reasoning that this resembles mesayei'a bei sagronos. Why doesn't the same logic that validates terumah also validate pidyon haben?
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Kiddushin 6b
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