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When witnesses testify that Reuven killed Shimon, then other witnesses contradict them (hakasha), and then a third pair impeaches the first (hazama)—can the first pair be executed? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle "hakasha kiltas hazama" (contradiction cancels impeachment) is explored through two approaches: does hakasha retroactively void the original verdict, or does it merely prevent the third pair from being believed over the first?
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 63a-63b, focusing on the intricate laws of eidus (testimony) and the principles governing hazama (impeachment of witnesses) and hakasha (contradictory testimony). The Gemara (גמרא) begins with a statement from Rav: "Eidim she'huchshu ulfi'soch chuzmu"—witnesses who first faced contradictory testimony (hakasha) and then were impeached (hazama)—such witnesses are not executed. This raises a fundamental question: why not? The basic principle seems straightforward—if hazama normally requires execution, and we have hazama here, why should the prior hakasha matter? The core difficulty is understanding the temporal dimension of witness impeachment. When witnesses testify falsely on Sunday that Reuven killed Shimon, and a verdict is rendered, they committed their transgression on Sunday. If on Tuesday other witnesses create hakasha (contradiction), and on Wednesday a third pair impeaches them through hazama (proving they were elsewhere), we are punishing them on Wednesday for what they did on Sunday. Why should the Tuesday hakasha interfere with Wednesday's hazama? The sin occurred on Sunday—shouldn't that be sufficient grounds for execution?
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Bava Kamma 63a-63b
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