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Why does Rav Yehuda accept smucha in Mishna Torah (תורה) but reject it elsewhere? The shiur explores whether smucha is peshat hapasuk (text interpretation) or divrei sofrim (rabbinic hermeneutics). This distinction determines when juxtaposition can create halacha (הלכה)—only where the pasuk otherwise lacks meaning, or even when it contradicts an existing gezeira shava.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question in the Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos 5a regarding the hermeneutical principle of smucha (juxtaposition of verses). The central question is why Rav Yehuda accepts smucha as a valid method of deriving halacha (הלכה) in Mishna Torah (תורה) (Deuteronomy) but rejects it in the rest of the Torah. The Gemara discusses the case of "Mechashefa lo s'chayeh" (a sorceress shall not live) juxtaposed with "Shochev im beheima yumat" (one who lies with an animal shall die). The smucha would teach that just as the latter receives skilah (stoning), so does the former. Rav Yehuda questions this: "V'chi mah smucha inyan lo?" - how can we derive such a stringent punishment from mere juxtaposition?
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Yevamos 5a
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