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How can Rashi (רש"י) use the term "pasul" when describing a stolen lulav, given that the deficiency is merely "lachem"—a lack of ownership rather than a flaw in the object itself? The shiur analyzes Rashi's understanding that "lachem" creates an actual disqualification because someone else's ownership introduces a foreign element into the mitzvah (מצוה). It also explores Rashi's definition of lulav as "kaf shel tamar," requiring both backbone and leaves as essential components.
This shiur on Sukkah 29b offers a close reading of Rashi (רש"י) on the Mishna dealing with disqualified lulavim. Rabbi Zweig opens by noting that Rashi defines "lulav" as "kaf shel tamar" (palm branch), which seems to be more than a simple translation—it establishes that a lulav consists of two essential components: the backbone (shedra) and the leaves together. This definition becomes critical for understanding later Rashis in the Mishna. The central focus of the shiur is Rashi's statement that a stolen lulav is "pasul" because of the requirement "ulakachtem lachem"—it must be yours. Rabbi Zweig raises a fundamental question: how can Rashi use the term "pasul" (disqualified) for something that is merely lacking the status of "lachem"? The word "pasul" implies an inherent defect or flaw in the object itself—a mum in the chefetz. Yet the problem with a stolen lulav is not that anything is wrong with the lulav; it simply doesn't belong to you. The deficiency is in the ownership relationship, not in the physical object. This seems to be a misuse of terminology—one should say "lo yatza" (the obligation is not fulfilled) rather than "pasul."
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Sukkah 29b
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