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Can a woman be mekudeshes by forgiving part of a loan she owes, and if so, is this ribbis? Rashi (רש"י) distinguishes between paying for the use of money (ribbis) and paying someone not to actively collect — a payment for forbearance rather than extension. The shiur explores whether such forbearance constitutes real hana'ah sufficient for kiddushin, even when the creditor can change his mind.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6b, focusing on Rashi (רש"י)'s position regarding mikadeish b'milve — engagement through loan forgiveness. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a woman owes a man money and he says, "Be mekudeshes to me with this pruta that you would have spent to have someone appease me" (or with the pruta you save through mechilah). The fundamental question is whether this constitutes ribbis and whether such engagement is valid. Rashi's position is that this is only "harama of ribbis" — it appears like ribbis but is not actual ribbis, neither d'oraisa nor d'rabanan. The shiur establishes a crucial yesod: Rashi distinguishes between two types of payment. True ribbis is paying for the use of money — renting money for an extended period, which creates a real obligation. Here, however, the borrower is not paying for extended use of the money or changing the due date of the loan. Rather, she is paying the lender not to actively pursue collection — a payment for forbearance or non-harassment.
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Kiddushin 6b
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