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Can a woman be mekudeshes by forgiving part of a loan she owes, and if so, is this ribbis? Rashi (רש"י) distinguishes between paying for the use of money (ribbis) and paying someone not to actively collect — a payment for forbearance rather than extension. The shiur explores whether such forbearance constitutes real hana'ah sufficient for kiddushin, even when the creditor can change his mind.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6b, focusing on Rashi (רש"י)'s position regarding mikadeish b'milve — engagement through loan forgiveness. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a woman owes a man money and he says, "Be mekudeshes to me with this pruta that you would have spent to have someone appease me" (or with the pruta you save through mechilah). The fundamental question is whether this constitutes ribbis and whether such engagement is valid. Rashi's position is that this is only "harama of ribbis" — it appears like ribbis but is not actual ribbis, neither d'oraisa nor d'rabanan. The shiur establishes a crucial yesod: Rashi distinguishes between two types of payment. True ribbis is paying for the use of money — renting money for an extended period, which creates a real obligation. Here, however, the borrower is not paying for extended use of the money or changing the due date of the loan. Rather, she is paying the lender not to actively pursue collection — a payment for forbearance or non-harassment.
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Kiddushin 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
