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When a kohen performs the Temple service, is he acting as the Israelite's agent (shlichus didon) or Heaven's agent (shlichus d'shmaya)? Rabbi Zweig develops a two-tier framework: the avoda itself (the ritual acts) comes from Heaven's appointment, while kapara (atonement) is achieved for the Israelite. This distinction reconciles contradictory Gemaras and explains why the mudur hano (one who is forbidden to derive benefit) remains forbidden even when his korban is brought by others.
This advanced shiur on Nedarim 35 tackles the complex sugya of shlichus (agency) in the context of korbanos. The central question is whether the kohen performing the Temple service is considered a shliach didon (agent of the Israelite) or a shlichus d'shmaya/d'Rachmana (agent of Heaven). Rabbi Zweig opens by reviewing several difficulties (kashas) raised by Tosfos. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin discusses whether the baalim (owners of the sacrifice) have the right to transfer the service from one mishmar (priestly watch) to another. If it's shlichus didon, they should have that right; if shlichus d'shmaya, they don't. The Gemara in Nedarim, however, addresses a different question: whether a mudur hano from someone can benefit from a korban brought on his behalf. Tosfos observes that the Gemara in Kiddushin concludes shlichus d'shmaya (Heaven's agency), yet the Gemara in Nedarim seems to hold that it's shlichus didon to some extent, since the mudur hano is forbidden to benefit. This creates multiple kashas: (1) What does it mean to be shlichus didon if you still can't take the service out of the mishmar? (2) If it's shlichus didon, why can't the baalim transfer the service? (3) If the baalim didn't appoint the shliach (since ilo motzi ovid shlicho lo motzi meva — one cannot appoint an agent for something he himself cannot do), how can the Gemara say tikuni shadarticha v'lo l'avisi (I sent you for good, not for harm), which implies the Israelite did appoint him? (4) How can the Gemara in Yuma say the kohen is "shlucheinu" (our agent) if he's really Heaven's agent?
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Nedarim 35a
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